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Capital mobility in transition countries of Central Europe: macroeconomic 
performance factors and structural policies 
 
Abstract: 
In the course of transition, the former centrally planned economies of central Europe have 
attracted increasing shares of the international capital flows to emerging market economies. 
Moreover, compared to other world regions, a relatively large share of these flows has been 
constituted of foreign direct investment. An exploration of the determinants of these capital 
flows, using a neo-classical model, provided only medium-low levels of explanation, and the 
importance of considering institutional frameworks. The remainder of the paper examines 
the influence of financial sector development and of privatisation on foreign direct 
investment, portfolio investment, and ‘other’ forms of investment. 
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1.INTRODUCTION: FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE TRANSITION ECONOMIES 
 OF CENTRAL EUROPE 
 
  Global financial landscapes have changed significantly since the 1980s, not least 
through increased capital flows between developed countries and emerging markets 
(Blommestien and Biltoft, 1995). The latter were influenced by five main factors: (1) 
liberalisation of international capital transactions; (2) regulatory reforms of capital markets, 
both in the OECD members and emerging markets (Harris, 1997); (3) improvements in the 
macroeconomic performance of many developing and transition countries; (4) rapid progress 
in communication technologies and European Monetary Union preparations, which were 
reflected in interest rate reductions in the EU, and a search for alternative sources of higher 
yields by the portfolio managers of large institutional investors; and (5) privatisation and 
structural economic policies in many emerging markets. These changes are observed in 
most emerging markets, including the Central European transition countries (the Czech and 
Slovak Republics, Hungary and Poland). 
 
  Economic development in the centrally planned economies was based on extensive 
inputs of domestic labour and capital. While these generated high growth rates in the 1950s 
and 1960s, the relationship weakened thereafter. The domestic labour inputs were initially 
enabled by mass rural-urban migration, feminisation of the labour force, and relatively high 
population growth rates, but their generating power waned over time. As for capital sources, 
forced capital accumulation, reflected in limited consumption of consumer goods and 
services, was unable to offset a capital deficit. From the 1970s, some state socialist regimes 
sought capital inputs from developed capitalist economies. These mostly materialised as 
loans provided by Western governments or major institutional investors, rather than as 
portfolio investment or foreign direct investment. The capital loans provided to Poland and 
Hungary in the 1970s and 1980s were mostly allocated to inefficient development projects or   4 
to imports of consumer goods. By the late 1980s, both countries had substantial foreign 
debts, with burdensome repayments. Capital outflows from Poland, in particular, meant that 
the central European countries experienced massive capital outflows in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s (Table 1). In total, the four transition economies received only $ 420 million of 
net foreign investment, 1990-1994, compared to the net $ 142.1 billion received by three 
Latin America countries (Argentina, Brazil and Mexico) and the $ 111.9 billion in three Asian 
countries (Korea, Malaysia and Thailand). The situation, however, changed in the second 
half of 1990s, and the four Central European transition economies had $ 43.6 billion of net 
capital inflows, 1995-1997. Although this still lags behind the other emerging markets in 
absolute terms, the structure and per capita distributions of the capital flows present a more 
complex picture (Table 1). 
 
(Table 1 near here) 
 
  In relative terms (per capita net inflows), the four transition economies had the largest 
capital inflows amongst the emerging markets. Moreover, the structures of the flows differed 
with foreign direct investment being the main component in central Europe, indicative of a 
higher ‘quality’ (long-term capital with no increased foreign debt). This paper examines 
whether macroeconomic performance and prospects for short-term returns from financial 
investments, or long-term foreign investor considerations generated these major structural 
changes in capital flows 
. 
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2. CAPITAL FLOWS AND THE MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
 
  While capital flows fluctuated over the short term in the 1990s, the emerging markets 
received considerable capital inflows from the developed countries over the longer term. 
These flows can be explained through different perspectives. The neo-classical approach, 
for example, is based on benefit maximisation, assumes efficient markets, perfect 
information, and rational behaviour (for example, the efficient markets theory). This 
approach starts from an analysis of capital asset pricing. Investment decisions are based on 
profit/risk factors. Investors weigh the present value of a stream of returns from relatively 
risk-free assets against the streams from assets in emerging markets, taking into account 
the country’s risk premium. More fully elaborated neo-classical models also take into account 
different types of investment, for which foreign investors have different time horizons and 
objectives: capital gains (price arbitrages), dividend or interest yield, portfolio diversification, 
and combinations of these. There are also strategic investors, with very different objectives. 
An investor in a car factory, for example, is mainly interested in acquiring a new market, so 
that purchasing power, and labour market features are likely to be more important than stock 
market regulations and share prices fluctuations (of key importance to portfolio investors). 
Agglomeration effects also influence foreign investment decisions (Geenhuizen and 
Nijkamp, 1998: 111). Finally, speculative investors focus on short-term movements in 
interest and foreign exchange rates, and the margins between returns in the host country 
and international markets. This  ‘differentiating’ approach  is backed by risk/profit 
considerations on capital asset pricing. Another version of the neo-classical approach also 
starts with capital assets pricing, but assumes that investment decisions take place in 
imperfect markets with incomplete information. (Levine and Zervos, 1998) It assumes that 
investors are not always governed by rational considerations and analyses of underlying 
assets but  tend to ‘herd’, imitating the behaviour of market leaders. ‘Investor herding’ 
accentuates unpredictability, and is weakly related to developments in real economies. In   6 
practice, it is difficult to separate fluctuations in capital flows generated by imperfect 
information and subjective investment decisions, but ‘herding’ effects are mostly observed in 
portfolio and short-term capital flows, and are less significant for foreign direct investment.  
 
  While these approaches emphasise different factors in the analysis of capital flows, 
they are not contradictory and frequently overlap. The factors recognised by the capital asset 
pricing models can be assigned to two major groups, The first are internal (country specific) 
or ‘pull factors’, which refer to economic, social and political developments in an emerging 
market. They can be further subdivided (Lensink and White, 1998) into economic 
performance factors (such as GDP growth, inflation rates, trade and budget balances, 
saving rates, and wage levels) and creditworthiness factors (such as the debt to exports and 
GDP ratios, or international currency reserves to GDP). Secondly, external (country non-
specific) or ‘push’ factors refer to developments in international markets, and can be 
expressed in terms of differences between rates of return on alternative investment on 
international markets and those in the host country. The two sets of factors are linked: there 
is an inverse relationship between the differences between rates of return on international 
and host country markets, and the importance of internal factors. This partly explains why 
the transition economies have been favoured during EMU preparations in the 1990s. As 
interest rates in the EU zone converged on historically low levels, investors sought 
alternative sources of higher-yield investments. 
 
  The key question is the relative importance of internal and external factors for capital 
flows to transition economies? As indicated earlier, the answer is contingent for different 
investors, investments and time periods. An extensive literature review by Maxfield (1998) 
suggests that external factors have been more important. Several studies (for example, 
Fernandez-Arias, 1996) discovered a significant correlation between declining the US real 
interest rates and rising capital inflows into small developing countries in one period time lag.   7 
The same study also analysed creditworthiness factors, derived from the secondary market 
prices for the countries’ bonds. The higher the margin between the host country’s and 
international real interest rates, the less important was the country’s creditworthiness. The 
combined direct and indirect impacts of international interest rates explained 86 percent of 
the variation in capital inflows to an emerging market. The significance of external factors, 
mainly interest rates in the more developed markets, was also observed in other studies. 
The risk premiums paid by emerging markets reflected more their inflation and default 
histories than their current macroeconomic situations. Of course, the degree of global 
economic integration is positively related to the importance of external factors. Globalisation 
has opened new channels for capital mobility for the emerging markets, but has increased 
their volatility and unpredictability. Taylor and Sarno (1997) analysed portfolio flows from the 
USA to nine Latin American and nine Asian countries, 1988-1992, and established that 
global and country-specific factors were equally important for determining long-run equity 
movements. However, external factors (US interest rates, in particular) exerted more 
influence on short-run bond flows to emerging market. 
 
  Turning to internal factors, Lensink and White (1998) analysed 7 performance and 5 
creditworthiness indicators for 60 Third Word countries (including sub-Saharan Africa). They 
found that the performance variables of annual GDP growth, trade balance/GDP, broad 
money/GDP and GNP per capita in constant 1987 $ were robust and powerful in explaining 
the attraction of foreign private capital. Gastanaga et al (1998) established the significance 
of GDP growth, corporate tax cuts, tariff jumping and trade liberalisation for increases in 
capital inflows into developing countries. Ul Haque et all (1997b) established that the ratio of 
foreign currency reserves to imports, the ratio of current account balance to GDP, and 
growth and inflation rates were most important in determining credit rating. 
 
  These studies mostly analysed macroeconomic indicators for samples of developing   8 
countries, from various continents, with different development levels and capital regulation 
systems. Holland and Pain (1998) adopted a broader framework, focusing on 10 transition 
economies in Europe. In addition to macroeconomic data such as relative wages, relative 
(labour) productivity and risk factors, their analysis also included an institutional assessment. 
This ‘structuralist’ approach considers, for example, the role of the private sector, 
membership of international organisations, privatisation, the legal framework, the fairness of 
trading, and the efficiency of regulatory institutions. Holland and Pain’s research did not 
incorporate all these conditions and was mainly limited to privatisation and EU integration. 
They found that privatisation methods, relative wages and EU proximity were the most 
significant factors explaining the share of FDI in national GDP. While explaining some two 
thirds of the international variance in FDI, the analysis had shortcomings. It did not, for 
example, consider time lags between the indicators values and FDI volumes, although it is 
reasonable to assume that long-term foreign investors react to changes in structural policies 
in the same year. Privatisation methods also changed over time, often abruptly, and can not 
be reduced to simple numerical values. The analysis also classified privatisation according to 
the original administrative models (voucher privatisation, direct sales, buy-outs etc.) and did 
not consider subsequent (re)privatisation through market mechanisms. Despite these 
shortcomings, Holland and Pain’s ‘institutional framework’ analysis provides an useful 
approach to capital flows. 
 
  This paper seeks to identify the factors which were significant in attracting capital 
flows in transition economies. Initially, adopting a neo-classical approach, macroeconomic 
indicators were analysed following Lensink and White’s methods, subject to two important 
modifications. First, we analysed different types of capital flows, as expressed in the net 
capital account balance in the International Financial Statistics of the IMF: foreign direct 
investment (FDI), portfolio investment (PI) and other investments (OI). Secondly, whereas 
Lensink and White’s study was mainly concerned with low-income countries, 1987-1994, this   9 
paper focuses on the Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland and Hungary, 1990-1997, as the 
most consistent group of European transition economies. The following variables were 
entered into the multiple regression equation: dependent variables FDI, PI and OI (net 
investment as a percentage of GDP) and the independent variables GROWTH (percentage 
annual GDP growth), INF (annual growth in consumer prices), CA (current account balance, 
as percentage of GDP), M2 (share of M2 aggregate in GDP), MARGIN (difference between 
real deposit rates in transition economies and average of deposit rates in the USA, UK and 
Germany), GDP (per capita, computed via exchange rates) and POP (population). The 
analysis did not consider the time lag between the indicator performance in the current year 
and investment flows for ‘other investments’. Some ‘other investments’ were loan facilities 
arranged by international financial institutions, more concerned with strategic targets than 
speculative ends. Additionally, most of the ‘other net investments’ were short-term deposits, 
loans and securities owned by foreign private investors, which were based on price 
fluctuations for which the one-year lag would be too long. In contrast, current year and one-
year time lag data were used for FDI and portfolio investment, but the time lag was 
significant only for the former. With respect to the MARGIN variable, the original aim had 
been to use differences in short-term interest rates in transition and developed markets. As 
these were unavailable in the early transition period, deposit rates were preferred to discount 
rates, due to their greater flexibility. The results are summarised in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 near here  
 
  The analysis of capital flows to/from transition countries in Central Europe confirmed 
some of the findings of previous studies of developing countries but also emphasised the 
importance of differences in the structure of international investors’ targets and time 
horizons. As for FDI, four independent variables were important at the 90 per cent 
confidence level, with GDP per capita and the ratio of M2 to GDP being most significant.   10 
This broadly accords with Lensink and White’s (1998) findings that FDI is most likely to be 
directed to economies with relatively high development levels (GDP per capita) and relatively 
developed financial systems (ratios of broad money to GDP). FDI investors have longer-term 
targets, and were less influenced by fluctuations in interest rates and trade balances. 
Decreases in inflation and increases in GDP growth seemed to provide a broader framework 
for investment decisions in these transition economies. However, the explanatory power of 
the model (R
2 = 0.372) was medium-low, indicating that other factors, not included in this 
analysis, were important in determining FDI flows. 
 
  The results were less convincing for portfolio investment (R
2 = 0.101). Only per capita 
GDP levels were significant (both for the current year and one year time lag). Portfolio 
investors were a diverse group, ranging from large pension funds and insurance companies 
with relatively stable yield policies for ‘buy and hold’ to speculative investors interested in 
short-term price arbitrage. This heterogeneity may have obscured the analysis of the 
independent variables. 
 
  ‘Other investments’ were also constituted of different investor types and time 
horizons, but most were concerned with interest yields. Not surprisingly, the interest margin, 
ratio of M2/GDP and inflation rate were the most significant independent variables. The three 
combinations of underlying factors had medium strength explanatory powers, with the 
combination of inflation and margin being most influential. These two independent variables, 
however, were collinear. The combination of M2 and INF factors did not suffer from 
collinearity and offered the best explanation of the determinants of ‘other’ investment flows 
(R
2 = 0.422) 
 
  Analyses of variations in capital inflows and outflows must be approached cautiously, 
given their methodological problems. Different types of investment flows are   11 
interchangeable. Investors in a car factory (FDI), for example, may hedge their long-term risk 
exposure to the market with a compensating financial transaction (Maxfield, 1998: 1207). 
The borders between FDI and portfolio investments are not always clear. Most transition 
countries have tried to follow EU practices (Directive 88/627/EEC) and, for example, have a 
5 percent limit for the disclosing the identities of qualifying shareholders in publicly traded 
companies. However, in practice, individual investors wishing to take over enterprises may 
hide behind formally independent groups of portfolio investors. Furthermore, some short-
term inflows may be used for leverage operations in the acquisition of portfolio assets or 
long-term assets.  
 
  There is also the question of the extent to which domestic investment is really 
domestic. Foreign investors were not allowed to participate in some privatisation 
programmes but in practice financed the new domestic owners. On the other hand, not all 
foreign investments were really foreign. There were thriving black and shadow economies in 
the transition states, with widespread tax evasion and money laundering. Capital frequently 
was transferred to international tax havens, only to reappear in the clothing of foreign 
investment, safe from tax office and police investigation.  
 
  Summing up, four factors were significant for capital inflows to transition economies 
in Central Europe: GDP levels, histories of low inflation, relatively high ratios of broad money 
to GDP, and relatively high margins between domestic and international interest rates. The 
latter two appear to be most important, which indicates the importance of financial sector 
development levels. In general, however, models based on macroeconomic indicators had 
low-medium explanatory powers. Macroeconomic stability seemed to be a required but not a 
sufficient condition for attracting large volumes of FDI. This suggests that more attention 
should be paid to analyses of the institutional framework of foreign capital flows. The 
institutional framework has both external components (association agreements with the EU,   12 
for example) and internal ones. The next two sections consider the latter, and in particular 
the development of the financial sector and privatisation. 
 
3. FINANCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT 
 
  The role of foreign capital in a small open economy is determined not only by the 
volume and structure of capital flows, but also by the capacity to use these effectively, which 
normally requires an efficient capital market, a healthy banking sector and sound 
macroeconomic policy. These conditions were rare in the transition economies, and instead 
there were usually non-transparent and illiquid capital markets, weak banking and capital 
market supervision, high shares of non-performing bank loans, and a lack of effective 
investor protection. 
 
  Banking reform became a cornerstone of financial system reform. Except for the USA 
and UK, where capital markets account for the major share of capital flows, banks dominate 
investment financing in most developed national economies. Banks also have other 
functions in financial markets, notably clearing, settlement and foreign exchange operations. 
Singh and Weisse (1998: 617), drawing on the experiences of both the developed and newly 
industrialised economies, argue that ‘developing countries would do better to reform the 
institutional structures of their banking systems rather than create stock markets, which 
require sophisticated monitoring. The banks are able to effectively evaluate credit risk, ex 
post, as well as monitor the performance of the management during the course of the 
investment itself’. In contrast, they consider stock market development and portfolio capital 
inflows to be speculative and unlikely to facilitate rapid long-term growth. 
 
  The evidence from the transition economies is mixed but does not confirm the role of 
banks as watchdogs of effective investment allocation. Despite rapid development of capital   13 
markets in the transition economies, these essentially remained ‘bank economies’, with 
credit institutions being the main source of capital and remaining major players on national 
stock exchanges. Banking systems in transition economies developed via detachment of 
commercial and saving banks from central state banks, resulting in the creation of bank 
oligopolies. These were in state ownership and their privatisation was opposed by various 
political and economic interest groups in the name of ‘national interest’. There were also 
banks established by domestic and foreign private investors but, having to develop new 
market networks, they accounted for relatively minor shares of total domestic deposits and 
credits. In contrast, state-owned bank oligopolies inherited millions of relatively conservative 
customers in the household sector, and had a large share of total deposits. This imperfect 
competition had largely negative consequences for national finances. Firstly, bank 
oligopolies achieved wide spreads between deposit and lending rates, but these also 
contributed to the decreasing efficiency of financial intermediation (Knight, 1998). Secondly, 
increasing lending rates drove more borrowers to default but, as most had debts in the state-
owned banks, the volumes of non-performing loans held by the latter increased sharply. Only 
a few larger companies were able to utilise alternative and cheaper sources of finance, such 
as international loan and debenture markets. 
 
  The reform of the banking sector and enterprise restructuring were closely related to 
bank privatisation and the entry of foreign capital. By 1998, the state and foreign shares of 
total bank assets varied across central Europe (Banker, p. 43, 1999):   14 
 
    State  (%)  Foreign  (%) 
Czech Republic   18     14 
Hungary     12     62  
Poland     48     16 
Slovakia     49     19  
 
Those countries which had privatised their financial sectors and sold the major financial 
institutions to foreign investors had new owners who were more interested in increasing 
investment efficiency. However, in these countries (Hungary, for example), the economic 
situation only improved gradually in the 1990s. Those countries where financial market 
reforms were more laggardly (Slovakia, for example, partly the Czech Republic) were less 
attractive to foreign investors. They not only had lower volumes of foreign capital inflows, but 
also lower quality capital structures, with short-term and often volatile speculative 
investments being significant. The question for the transition economies was not only how to 
attract capital, but also how to manage its structure, achieve a positive balance of capital in- 
and outflows, and allocate capital to development projects with high efficiency levels. 
 
  Various economic policies were used by national governments to attract foreign 
investment, ranging from tax breaks to government support via general infrastructure 
development. For the foreign investors, the key factors in decision making were: political 
stability, a stable macroeconomic environment, minimal levels of bureaucracy, and  a non-
discriminatory state approach to domestic and foreign investors (as indicated, for example, 
in the regular country ratings published by Euromoney). Tax breaks or infrastructure projects 
were less important. As for the macroeconomic environment, the transition economies were 
able to manage most of the external and internal shocks resulting from the collapse of the 
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) markets and the implementation of market 
reforms. In the relatively short period of four years (1990-1993) they halted the decline in 
their GDP, reduced inflation, and reorganised their production structures. The Czech   15 
Republic, Hungary and Poland also established functioning democratic structures, ensuring 
relative political stability, and were assigned to the first group of candidates for the proposed 
EU eastern enlargement (CEC, 1998). There was less progress in Slovakia, especially under 
the Mečiar government’s relatively authoritarian rule. While levels of macroeconomic and 
political stability were generally similar in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, their 
attitudes to foreign investment differend with respect to privatisation. 
 
 
4. PRIVATISATION: PRECONDITIONS AND POLICIES 
 
  Privatisation in central Europe was a large scale process of redefining property rights. 
By 1995, the assets involved in privatisation accounted for 72.8 percent GDP in the Czech 
Republics, 48 percent in Slovakia, 16 percent in Hungary and 26.2 percent in Poland 
(Williams and Baláž, 1999; Csépi and Lukács, 1995; Češka, 1995; Pater, 1995; and 
Porvazník, 1994). Initially, privatisation schemes were mainly analysed from the viewpoint of 
government policies and the neo-liberal rhetoric prevailing in the region in early 1990s (Ash 
et al, 1994; Ridder and Zajicek, 1995; Rutland, 1997). Little attention was paid to the 
preconditions of privatisation and the influence of interest groups in most transition countries. 
 
  The national models of economic development had diverged by 1989 in central 
Europe. Hungary and Poland, for example, had dismantled central planning at least in the 
small business sector and had decentralised enterprise management (Fogel and Etcheverry, 
1994). They also secured significant foreign loans in the 1980s. By 1989 about one third of 
the labour force in Poland was employed in the private sector, producing one quarter of 
GDP. Poland and Hungary had also experienced the so-called spontaneous or nomenklatura 
privatisation (Ash et al, 1994). In Hungary, private businesses had also been established by 
individuals working outside the public sector (in retailing, hotels and restaurants in   16 
particular). In the public sector, state institutions (‘holdings’, enterprises, and banks) began 
to diversify their activities and emerged as owners of diverse subsidiaries (Voszka 1993: 89). 
Therefore, many of the preconditions of ownership transformation were in place in Hungary 
and Poland by 1989, including market institutions, entrepreneurial behaviour, and the 
decentralisation of property rights form the central state to local economic units.  
 
Czechoslovakia, in contrast, remained more wedded to central planning 
(Landesmann and Székely, 1995) and had little experience of market reforms. This explains 
why mass privatisation schemes (the Coupon Privatisation), which favoured domestic and 
foreign financial institutions, was less opposed in the former Czechoslovakia by the 
managerial class in the early stage of transition. In Poland and Hungary, these classes had 
more experience of the opportunities provided by the redefinition of property rights and 
opposed mass privatisation. In Poland, mass privatisation did not start until 1997 whilst it has 
been insignificant in Hungary. Hence, the balance of power between domestic and foreign 
interest groups was an important factor in channelling FDI to particular countries, especially 
in the early stage of transition. Holland and Pain (1998: 16), for example, argue that 
‘countries with a programme of direct privatisation through cash sales have attracted 
relatively higher inward investment then those countries using voucher privatisation’. 
 
  Hungary’s main comparative advantage was its gradualism. Market reforms were 
introduced from the 1970s (Stark, 1997), while the 1991 Accounting Law and the Financial 
Institutions Law introduced accounting, bankruptcy and banking practices similar to those in 
the EU. As a result, bankruptcies increased sharply, and given the outstanding debts with 
the banks, the financial system was in crisis within a year. The state bailed out many banks 
and enterprises in default and, by end of 1993, $ 3 billion had been spent on purchasing 
non-performing loans and enterprise debts, and recapitalising banks with capital adequacy 
ratios close to zero. The state became the major shareholder in the largest commercial   17 
banks and hoped the banks would initiate enterprise restructuring. The bank managers, 
however, had little incentive to do so and the Hungarian Ministry of Finance failed to monitor 
effectively the recapitalisation funds. In short, the state proved to be an ineffective majority 
shareholder. The poor loan portfolio of the banking system changed only after the large 
banks had been privatised and the entry of foreign investors increased competition (Koch 
1998). Bank privatisation was also reflected in reduced spreads between interests on loans 
and deposits, with positive consequences for economic efficiency. 
 
  The pace of Hungarian privatisation and enterprise restructuring increased, with 
foreign investors being prominent. In 1990, over 1800 state-owned enterprises were 
earmarked for privatisation, with book values of $ 30 billion (Csépi and Lukács, 1995). 
Strategic investors were sought for the large companies, while medium-sized companies were 
sold to foreign or Hungarian investors through competitive bidding. Smaller companies were 
either directly sold or implemented their own privatisation programmes. Sales to foreign 
investors dominated the privatisation process, and by end of 1994 385 such sales had 
generated almost $ 4 billion. In contrast, ESOP (employee privatisation) schemes and 
restitution schemes accounted only for $ 1.2 billion. 
  
  In Czechoslovakia, in early 1990, the coupon privatisation temporarily favoured the 
financial lobby (banks and investment privatisation funds, IPFs), which in many cases were 
backed by foreign capital. Coupon Privatisation through the IPFs was supposed to promote 
collective investment and create a liquid market with large numbers of listed shares and strong 
institutional investors. Whereas in developed market economies there are two major forms of 
collective investment institutions, mutual funds and holding companies, the Czechoslovak 
government tried to create a new type of hybrid institutional investor. This was to be 
problematic and, after the Harvard Funds of Viktor Kožený (Fogel, 1994) had been positioned 
to control 40% of all Czechoslovak coupons, the federal government belatedly imposed (via the   18 
1992 Investment Companies Act), a 20% ceiling (latter reduced to 10%) on the privatised 
assets obtained by any one investment group. While the IPFs were defined as portfolio 
investors, they were also expected to be actively involved in company restructuring. 
 
  In practice, the Czechoslovak coupon privatisation scheme was effectively controlled by 
14 institutions - nine banks, two insurance companies and two investment groups. In Slovakia 
alone, the five largest investment companies acquired 43% of all investment coupons, whilst 
the twenty largest investment companies acquired 58%. Over the next two years, these 
investment companies became decisive players on the Slovak capital markets, being able to 
determine the prices of stocks. In the Czech Republic, the situation was similar: the IPFs 
obtained 71.8%, with the top six funds obtaining 41.1%, of the total investment coupons points. 
However, after the transfer of assets into the IPF portfolios, the funds (and their parent banks) 
found that approximately 95 percent of the shares were illiquid, and the accounts of the 
underlying companies were in the red. 
 
  One consequence of the Coupon Privatisation was the reluctance of potential foreign 
investors to invest in the privatised enterprises. Where, for example, 97% of the shares in an 
enterprise were allocated to Coupon Privatisation, these were diluted among thousands of 
minor shareholders and there was no clear and strong owner. The participation of foreign 
investors was usually dependent on the establishment of major shareholdings (usually by 
securities dealers, assembling packages of minor stakes). In contrast, if only 10-20 percent 
of the shares in an enterprise were allocated to the Coupon Privatisation, the rest (the 
majority) remaining with the Czech and Slovak National Property Funds, potential investors 
could try to purchase majority stakes from NPFs. In practice, however, there were a number 
of enterprises where 30-60 percent stakes had been allocated to the Coupon Privatisation, 
and where future ownership rights were unclear. Even if, for example, a foreign investor 
assembled 40 percent of the diluted shares, the NPF could sell the remaining 60 percent to   19 
another investor as one block. This created a high level of risk for the foreign (minority) 
investor, due to low levels of minor shareholders protection.  
 
Most enterprises were heavily indebted to the banks and many had a legacy of 
substantial ‘environmental costs or debts’. In many cases, foreign investors would have 
found it easier to take over the assets of bankrupted enterprises. However, the Czech and 
Slovak governments feared the social and political impacts of rising unemployment and, 
therefore, made bankruptcies virtually impossible. The banks, which were the main creditors, 
were also wary of bankruptcies, because most of their capital was invested in the enterprise 
sector in the early transition period. There was a genuine fear that bankruptcies could have 
cascading effects across the entire economy. Therefore, instead of selling unprofitable 
enterprises to foreign or domestic investors, the banks continued to accumulate non-
performing loans.  
 
The Czech government tried to solve the problem by transferring privatisation income 
from the National Property Fund to the banks, but with few positive results in the two main 
state-owned commercial banks and the savings bank. Their closure was politically 
impossible since most of their financial sources came from household savings. By the mid-
1990s, the once highly praised Czech privatisation programme was riddled with 
contradictions. Not least, while most state-owned enterprises were privatised and the private 
sector accounted for some 70 percent of GDP, property rights were confused. The banks 
had a conflict of interest being the main lenders to and the owners of these enterprises (both 
directly and indirectly via the IPFs). This and other contradictions were reflected in their poor 
asset management. For example, the largest Czech bank, the Komerční Banka, had been 
partly privatised via coupon privatisation, but this failed to introduce either new capital or 
foreign management know-how. Analysing the bank’s asset management, Snyder and 
Kormend (1997: 126) comment that ‘credit allocation decisions cannot be explained as the   20 
outcome of the profit maximisation. The real-sector consequence include delays in 
enterprise restructuring, less than optimal equity financing and an over-reliance on short-
term credit’. The IPFs, which controlled some 70% of the assets from the coupon 
privatisation, also could not exercise control over individual enterprises, because the 1992 
Investment Company and Fund Law limited their holdings in any one company to just 10% 
which effectively made them portfolio investors.  
 
  In 1998, the Czech government finally decided to privatise the bank oligopolies and 
permit the entry of foreign capital into the sector. The Investiční a Poštovní Banka, for 
example, was acquired by the Nomura group, the Československá Obchodní Banka by KBC, 
and the Agrobanka by General Electric. The closed-end  IPFs were also forced to sell their 
holdings in major Czech enterprises, and many of the new owners were probably foreign, 
although this is difficult to verify. In April 1998, a new Securities Commission was 
established, with extensive powers to combat fraud, market manipulation and non-
transparency (Jones, 1998a).  
 
  Our analysis agrees with McDermott’s assessment that the ‘vouchers left 
restructuring options quite constrained by a concentrated industry, ineffective IPFs and 
equity markets, low foreign investment and social malaise’. But his opinion that the problem 
was not so much the assignation of property rights so as to avoid conflicts of interests, but 
rather the distribution of property rights amongst interest groups and the creation of 
institutions for mediating compromises and solving conflicts (McDermott, 1997: 83 and 99) 
has not been borne out by events. The redefinition of ownership rights has led to clearer 
ownership structures and the establishment of majority owners. Economic agents sought to 
acquire majority stakes or effective executive powers in the privatised enterprises either by 
obtaining qualifying holdings from the National Property Funds (perhaps in exchange for 
political and financial support), or by ‘tunnelling’ the enterprise, whereby  they surreptitiously   21 
siphoned off its assets to their own businesses. In most cases, the agents were managers of 
former state-owned enterprises. For them, as for other investors, minority stakes in medium-
sized enterprises were risky due to limited protection of minor investors (Baláž, 1996). Few 
IPF managers tried either to defend shareholders rights or to restructure the underlying 
companies. Instead, they copied the transfer pricing practices of the enterprise managers 
which, in the shorter term, offered better (if mostly illegal) returns on investments. 
 
  Many financial and individual investors were unable to obtain strategic share holdings 
and therefore sold their minority stakes to managers and domestic (strategic) and foreign 
investors in the so-called ‘Third Wave of Privatisation’. This started in 1995 and was driven less 
by the legislative and organisational activities of the state, than by market forces. The agents in 
the Third Wave had various backers. In the Czech Republic, the managers of banks and 
several former IPFs backed most take-overs. They collected the diluted shares of the IPFs, 
used leverage effects and obtained majority stakes in privatised enterprises. In order to avoid 
the 10% ceiling rule, the IPFs were transformed to holding companies. In this way, relatively 
modest amounts of initial capital enabled the creation of large holding empires. It was the 
‘Third Wave’, which finally created effective owners of the enterprises privatised via mass 
privatisation programs. Their sources of capital were rarely disclosed and the new owners hid 
behind anonymous Ltd and Plc companies. But given the shortage of domestic capital, it is 
assumed that foreign capital was important. 
  
  The situation in Slovakia was broadly similar to that in the Czech Republic. Domestic 
banks were burdened with increasing shares of bad loans and the capital market became a 
place of market manipulation. The ‘Third Wave’ also occurred in Slovakia, if in a different form. 
After 1994, the Mečiar government was backed by domestic management lobbies, which 
benefited from cancellation of the Second Wave of coupon privatisation and international 
privatisation tenders, and their replacement by direct sales to ‘government friendly’ managers,   22 
who acquired almost all the assets privatised in 1994-1998. After several such ‘direct sales’ 
damaged the positions of foreign investors (e.g. the EBRD in case of the Slovnaft privatisation, 
see Williams and Baláž, 1999), foreign investors’ interest in Slovakia slumped. However, 
many of the new domestic owners were unable to manage effectively and, after some time, 
sold their assets to other (more capable) interest groups. These groups also used leveraging 
finance to take over companies formerly controlled by the IPFs. Similarly to the Czech 
Republic, the identity of the new owners remained obscure but, while some were probably 
foreign, the share of domestic investors was probably higher in Slovakia. 
 
  Poland followed a different pathway. Instead of creating nation-wide bank 
monopolies, 9 regional banks, 4 specialist banks and a foreign trade bank commenced 
operations after 1989. Polish governments reluctantly accepted the entry of foreign capital 
into the bank sector, but was only encouraged where the banks had structural problems 
(Koch, 1998). Therefore, most banks were privatised by domestic investors or remained in 
state ownership. The state, however, forced the banks to continue lending to heavily 
indebted state enterprises, which was ‘counter-productive as it leads to continuation of long-
standing client relationship with questionable profitability with troubled state-owned firms’ 
(Abarbanell and Bonin, 1997: 60). Therefore, despite initial reluctance, the government 
eventually permitted the gradual entry of foreign capital into the bank sector. This was 
facilitated by the insider information scandals associated with the privatisation of Bank 
Şląski. By 1998, 10 of the 14 Polish banks were in private hands and the privatisation of the 
remainder was under way (Jones, 1998b). Delays in the bank privatisation, however, had 
negative consequences for enterprise restructuring and foreign investment in the sector. 
 
  Polish enterprise privatisation was based on two basic programs (Pater, 1995).  Firstly, 
‘privatisation via liquidation’ was designed mainly for small and medium-sized enterprises, and 
usually involved leasing the company assets to managers, employees or other investors;   23 
foreign investors were excluded. Secondly, ‘privatisation via commercialisation’ was used for 
large and medium-sized enterprises. These were converted into joint-stock companies, with 
majority or minority stakes being offered to domestic and foreign investors. The major parts of 
these companies were sold via the mass privatisation programme, which created the National 
Investment Funds (NIFs). The scheme placed a small number of NIFs (operating as join-stock 
companies) in charge of over 500 state-owned enterprises.  Seeking to avoid the mistakes of 
the Czech and Slovak programmes, they tried to create effective owners of the privatised 
companies. Any one NIF was allowed to obtain a 33% stake in some 30 firms (Ellerman, 
1998), but this had one major shortcoming: it did not define clear ownership rights, and 
therefore a repeat of the Czechoslovakian experience is anticipated. There is likely to be a 
struggle over property rights until clear majority owners are established, which would have a 
positive influence on foreign investment. However, at the end of the 1990s, FDI per capita 
remained low in Poland compared to Hungary or the Czech Republic. 
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5. THE STRUCTURE OF CAPITAL FLOWS DURING TRANSITION 
 
  The four transition economies in Central Europe had different starting positions in 
1989 and their structural economic policies were significantly different during the transition 
period. These divergences, in turn, were reflected in different foreign capital structures 
(Table 2). 
 
Table 2 near here 
 
  Given differences in privatisation policies, Hungary’s success and Slovakia’s poor 
record in attracting FDI are not surprising. There were also significant differences in the 
integration of the state socialist countries into international financial markets. By the late 
1980s, Poland and Hungary had accumulated relatively large foreign debts, reflecting 
relatively high investment income flows (with deeply negative balances). In contrast, 
Czechoslovakia’s policy had been to minimise its foreign liabilities. On the credit side of the 
investment income balance, the centrally planned economies had virtually no foreign direct 
and portfolio investments in other countries, so that their investment income was generated 
by loans (rarely repaid), mostly to other state socialist regimes such as Libya and Vietnam. 
The flows on the debit side were also mostly constituted of loans, originating from Western 
private and public bodies. The interest on these loans had been a significant burden for 
Poland, in particular, since the early 1980s. The market reforms in the transition economies 
did have some positive impacts on their investment income. Hungary, for example, was able 
to re-pay much of its foreign debt. Poland, however, had to request debt re-scheduling in the 
mid 1990s. The previously strong foreign debt position of the Czech and Slovak Republics 
deteriorated over time especially their short-term commitments. In the Czech Republic, for 
example, the high volume of short-term liabilities to foreign creditors led to financial crisis 
and depreciation of the Czech koruna in 1998.   25 
  As argued above, privatisation policies and the international investment position in 
the early 1990s have had a major influence on the volumes and structure of foreign capital 
flows from/to the transition countries in Central Europe. In addition, a number of specific 
developments determined the net inflows of foreign capital to individual countries, including 
the national systems of financial market regulation, monetary policies and macroeconomic 
policies. 
 
Foreign direct investment 
  Foreign direct investment was rare in the former state socialist economies. The IMF 
for example, estimated that in 1989 there were some $ 268 million of FDI inflows into the 
former Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. In contrast, their total accumulated FDI, 1989-
1997, was $ 39.0 billion. While the increase was striking, it was by no means exceptional. In 
the same period, the newly industrialised countries in Latin America and Asia received far 
larger foreign investments. For example, three Latin America countries (Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico) received US$ 131.5 billion whilst three Asian countries (Korea, Malaysia and 
Thailand) received US$ 44.5 billion of FDI. There were several reasons for the relatively low 
inflows of foreign capital into the CE economies. First, with the exception of Poland, these 
were relatively small economies with relatively limited internal markets. Secondly, the 
privatisation methods in the Czech and Slovak Republics, and partially in Poland, favoured 
domestic investors. Thirdly, the transition economies in Central Europe had had less direct 
political and economic contacts with potential investors from the Anglo-American countries. 
Instead, some of their principal sources of investment, such as Germany and Austria, had 
been less prominent in capital exports than the USA or the UK. 
  Given their size differences, the volume of FDI inflows has be assessed in relative 
terms. In the period 1995-1997 (after implementation of the main privatisation programs), 
central Europe had the highest per capita capital inflows amongst the emerging markets. It 
also had the most advantageous structure of capital inflows, with FDI per capita levels being   26 
four times higher than in south-east Asia. At the level of individual countries, Hungary was 
the clear winner, followed by the Czech Republic. Poland should have been attractive to FDI, 
given its domestic market of 36 million people. Foreign investors have, however, been wary 
since Poland announced a moratorium on debt servicing. Slovakia had the poorest 
reputation because of its opaque privatisation policies, and received the lowest volumes of 
per capita FDI. 
 
Portfolio investments 
  Minority investors in the region faced difficulties because privatisation had created a 
situation whereby concentrated ownership, (domestic or foreign) was associated with better 
corporate governance and higher share prices (Claessens, 1997).  Therefore, portfolio 
investors were wary of the region, and FDI became the main vehicle for foreign investment. 
  While portfolio flows traditionally tended to be more volatile than FDI, they were not 
insignificant. Large international institutional investors (Blommestein, 1997) sought 
alternative investments in the face of decreasing interest rates in developed economies (in 
the wake of EMU preparations). This had profound implications for the development of 
financial markets in the transition economies: increased liquidity levels in local capital 
markets, and the introduction of a new market culture. Those countries which sought to 
attract major international investors had to improve their accounting, evaluation and 
disclosure standards, protect minority investors, and design a regulation framework 
compatible with those in the OECD countries.  
  
Portfolio investment accounted for a significant part of the net capital inflow in the 
Czech Republic. Foreign investors where mainly interested in shares in the early 1990s 
(because of the Coupon Privatisation scheme), but their interests gradually shifted to the 
debentures. Several leading Czech companies, mostly in the power supply sector, launched 
international issues. In Hungary, portfolio investment has developed since 1993 and   27 
accounts for approximately one half of total net capital inflows. The main targets were 
government bonds, T-bills and other debentures. In the late 1990s, there was an outflow of 
portfolio investment in the Czech Republic and Hungary, resulting from the general mistrust 
of emerging securities markets after the Asian and Russian financial crises. Moreover, both 
the Czech and Hungarian markets were small, and foreign investors were reluctant to 
increase their shares in the country’s market capitalisation beyond certain ceilings. The 
reputation of the Czech capital market had also been damaged by widespread fraud, low 
liquidity and non-transparency. The newly established Securities Commission, for example, 
found that 40 % of issuers failed in their disclosure dates in 1998, while listed company 
systematically did not announce negative events  which could affect investors. There was 
also routine fraud and mismanagement (Anderson, 1999). 
 
  The interest of foreign portfolio investors in Polish securities was moderate 
throughout the 1990s, despite Poland having one of the earliest and best regulated capital 
markets in the Central and Eastern Europe. However, delays in the mass privatisation 
programme limited the availability and range of stocks and private sector debentures. 
Interest in Slovak securities was even lower, especially after the second round of coupon 
privatisation had been replaced by direct sales, which led to Slovak capital market acquiring 
a reputation for low liquidity, lack of transparency and insider dealing (Baláž, 1998). 
 
Other investments 
  There were also a broad variety of flows, ranging from official aid provided by 
international financial institutions to speculative sales/purchases on the  banking and 
securities markets. The latter provided the major part of total turnover, and exceeded 
turnover in portfolio and FDI flows. The net capital inflow, however, was lower than in case of 
the FDI. Large volumes of highly volatile speculative capital flows posed problems for 
national governments and central banks in transition economies. Speculative capital was   28 
attracted by interest rate differences between the region and world money and capital 
markets. In advanced economies, with highly mobile capital, the sterilisation of such flows 
has little sustained effect. In the transition economies, short-term capital is more likely to spill 
over into domestic money markets and feed inflation. The banking system, which was 
supposed to mediate capital inflows, had structural weaknesses and insufficiently prudent 
supervision. In these circumstances, it would be reasonable for central banks to impose 
capital controls, limit the foreign exchange exposure of domestic banks and steer foreign 
capital towards financial instruments with longer maturity dates (Ul Haque et al, 1997a). The 
transition economies, however, sought early membership of the OECD which required the 
removal of capital controls. Governments and central banks therefore decided on different, 
solutions. 
 
  Most central banks realised the dangers of a liquidity crisis similar to that in Mexico in 
1994 and sought to sterilise speculative capital inflows by one of two methods: central bank 
securities issues and application of money multipliers, such as raising the reserve 
requirements imposed on domestic banks. These policies, however, were costly because of 
the impact of increasing interest rates on the state debt. They were also opposed by private 
enterprises which considered international finance a cheaper alternative to high domestic 
interest rates. Raising the reserve requirements on commercial banks de facto replaced  a 
tax on government with a tax on banks (Begg, 1997). Since the banking sector in transition 
economies was fragile, the additional burden endangered the entire system. The most 
serious crises were in the Czech and Slovak Republics, where indecisive privatisation of the 
largest banks allowed them to sink under increasing volumes of non-performing loans. 
 
  The Czech and Slovak governments, and enterprises in particular, tended to engage 
short-term commitments with foreign banks. These policies resulted in a liquidity crisis and 
depreciation of the Czech currency in 1997. There were similar developments, but with more   29 
serious currency consequences in Slovakia in 1998 and 1999. It became clear that prudent 
fiscal policies, which aimed to cut government budget deficits, were the main economic 
policy instruments for eliminating the negative consequences of speculative capital inflows 
and outflows. Prudent fiscal policies had to be accompanied by liberalisation of exchange 
rate regimes. Since the early 1990s, the transition economies had pegged their currencies to 
currency baskets of the $ and DM (Euro). Exchange rates were permitted to fluctuate within 
a range set by national banks. In the early transition stage, this helped reduce uncertainty in 
the domestic macroeconomic environment. Domestic inflation in that period, however, was 
far higher than prevailing international rates. In the early 1990s, national governments 
sought to reduce inflation but, paradoxically, less attention was paid to rapid increases in real 
wages. With exchange rates pegged (although adjusted via planned subsequent 
devaluations in Poland and Hungary), there was rapid real appreciation of exchange rates 
and wage levels. The appreciation resulted in declining competitiveness, decreasing exports 
and deepening trade deficits. High trade deficits, in turn, made it difficult to sustain the 
national exchange rates, as occurred, for example, in the Czech Republic in 1997 and 
Slovakia in 1998. The national banks tried to defend the current rates, but the high costs of 
intervention forced them to introduce a regime of fluctuating exchange rates. In a long-term 
view, the introduction of fluctuating currency regimes and cuts in government budget deficits 
helped to bring the transition countries into line with economic policies in the EU and OECD. 
These policies, in turn, provided economic environments which were more attractive to 
foreign investors, who were a source of higher-quality investment, notably FDI. If there is any 
general conclusion to be drawn from these developments, then small open economies in 
transition must apply sound fiscal and foreign trade policies in order to maintain both 
domestic macroeconomic stability and sustainable levels of capital inflows. 
 
  In terms of ‘other investment’ flows, the experiences of the transition countries in 
Central Europe were similar to those in most emerging markets: currency attacks, volatile   30 
speculative flows attracted by interest rates differentials, and financial crises. The trajectories 
of individual countries were also affected by specific developments, resulting from different 
starting positions in 1989, and from national policies of international indebtedness 
management. 
 
  In the state socialist period, Hungary obtained foreign capital almost exclusively via 
bank loans and the central government was the main recipient of these. Most of the funds 
were not directed to the production sector, but were used to offset a negative trade balance 
and, in fact, mainly funded purchases of consumer goods. Loan repayments in the 1990s 
caused significant economic difficulties. Fortunately, the outflow of loan capital was offset by 
large inflows of foreign direct investment. In the late 1990s, loan capital again increased in 
importance but the Hungarian banks were now the principal recipients. Many of the banks 
had been privatised by foreign investors, and their new owners mostly allocated the 
borrowed funds to the production sector. Poland had also been heavily indebted since the 
early 1980s and its economy was burdened with high levels of interest and principal 
repayment. Its position was weaker than Hungary’s, and this was reflected in larger inflows 
of speculative capital. Slovakia had the highest level of foreign capital secured via 
international bank loans to government and private enterprises, while FDI and portfolio 
investment were negligible. The structure of capital inflows reflected foreign strategic 
investors perceptions of the Slovak government in the period 1994-1998. Bank loans had 
reached relatively high levels by the end of the 1990s and the country faced the threat of a 
liquidity crisis. In the Czech Republic, there was a visible shift from government financial 
transfers towards private flows during the 1990s. While the government ceased to be the 
main recipient of loan capital, Czech banks and enterprises started to borrow abroad, adding 
to the economy’s foreign debt. By the end of the 1990s, a large part of Czech and Slovak 
government and private sector debt was in short-term commitments included in the ‘other 
investment’ category.   31 
  
  Foreign loan capital inflows can have ambiguous results. On the one hand, they may 
offset general capital shortages in a transition economy and provide the domestic private 
sector with funds at lower rates than are available from domestic banks. Even short-term 
loans may have this beneficial effect. On the other hand, widespread reliance by central 
government on foreign finance almost inevitably seems to result in a liquidity crisis. This was 
the case of several Latin-America countries in 1982, Poland in the 1980s, Mexico in 1993 
and 1994 and, to a lesser extent, Slovakia in 1998. Financing domestic growth from foreign 
funds may have positive results only where these funds are invested in export-oriented 
industries, generating inflows for the repayments. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
  The 1990s were a new period in the history of capital mobility in Central Europe. 
Capital inflows, in per capita terms, surged in all the transition economies to levels matching 
those in other emerging markets. Even more importantly, the capital structure was 
dominated by FDI. 
 
  Most analyses of capital mobility are concerned with the statistical evaluation of 
macroeconomic performance and creditworthiness indicators that are widely available and 
relatively amenable to econometric modelling. These studies are usually based on broad 
samples of countries, which allows the elimination of country-specific factors. This approach 
provides insights into some of the basic preconditions for attracting foreign capital (GDP 
levels, inflation history, growth rates, size of the monetary aggregates, etc.). But this 
approach does not allow us to understand differences in the experiences of individual 
countries, which otherwise are broadly similar in terms of development and their economic 
and political histories. These differences can only be understood by reference to the   32 
structural economic policies of particular countries. Such an approach (for example, see 
Holland and Pain, 1998) has its own difficulties (problems with time-lags, the quantification of 
privatisation policies, etc.), but does seem to provide a deeper understanding of various 
types of capital mobility. 
 
  Given the above qualifications, it is argued that cross-county studies of capital flows 
in very different economies and societies are problematic. There is considerable diversity not 
only within the group of transition economies, but even within the group of four most 
developed transition countries, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Poland. 
These four countries may have had similar development levels, applied comparable 
macroeconomic policies and moved closer to EU membership, but they also had different 
structural economic policies, especially in respect of privatisation and  the revitalisation and 
regulation of their financial systems. The latter have profound significance for both the 
volume and structure of capital flows. 
 
  Our statistical analysis indicated that financial system development levels were one of 
the basic pre-conditions for attracting and channelling FDI. Countries like Hungary, which 
privatised its financial sector in early stages of transition, enjoyed the advantage of a more 
sophisticated financial environment in the latter transition stages. Private capital flows to the 
privately-owned financial institutions exerted a leverage effect on the domestic economy. 
Those countries where the main financial institutions were in the public sector faced 
problems of inefficient investment allocation, reflected in increases in non-performing loans. 
Foreign groups in these economies had less opportunities and greater reluctance to invest in 
heavily indebted and poorly managed businesses. Such enterprises had to rely on short-
term borrowing on international capital markets at less advantageous borrowing terms. 
 
  Privatisation of the financial sector was closely connected with general privatisation   33 
policies. Firstly, sales of financial institutions to foreign investors accounted for a significant 
part of total privatisation sales to foreigners. Secondly, the countries which limited the 
participation of foreign investors in the financial sector also applied restrictions and 
discriminatory practices to those classes of domestic investors which were insufficiently 
‘government friendly’. So-called ‘strategic enterprises’ in particular, were excluded from sales 
to foreign investors, but were privatised by favoured domestic interest groups at large 
discounts.  
 
  The choice of privatisation policies was the second major factor shaping the volume 
and structure of capital flows. Those countries applying mass privatisation schemes (Czech 
and Slovak Republics), which generated neither real capital nor clear ownership, attracted 
relatively little foreign investor interest. Countries which had corrupt privatisation 
programmes, favouring ‘government friendly’ enterprise managers (Slovakia, partly the 
Czech Republic), also did not attract strategic investors. ‘Manager privatisation’ also 
generated little new capital. The new owners frequently were unable to manage effectively, 
lacking capital and, or managerial skills. Effective owners in these cases were found only 
after the ‘Third Wave’ of privatisation in the Czech and Slovak Republic, where (mostly 
anonymous) foreign and domestic bidders assumed control of bankrupted enterprises. It 
follows that the countries applying standard privatisation models (domestic and international 
tenders and auctions) attracted most strategic investment in the form of FDI. Hungary’s 
experience indicates that the FDI inflows resulted not only from the immediate sales of 
Hungarian enterprises to foreign investors, but also from creation of a favourable economic 
and institutional environment. This environment included not only a cheap and educated 
labour force and stable macroeconomic performance (which also existed in other countries), 
but a relatively healthy financial infrastructure with falling deposits/loans spreads. In contrast, 
those countries which hesitated over privatisation of their main enterprises and restructuring 
their financial sectors had to seek alternative financial sources and rely more on short-term   34 
capital, which made them more vulnerable to international currency speculation. 
 
  There have been significant variations in privatisation policies within central Europe, 
due not only not to differences in the overall economic strategies of national governments 
but also to the influence of economic and political interest groups. Where creative 
privatisation had started before 1989 (Hungary and Poland), there were more established 
classes of domestic entrepreneurs who opposed mass privatisation schemes. The 
Hungarian government, however, was able to sell most of its strategic enterprises to foreign 
investors in the early 1990s. Over time, the influence of domestic interest groups also 
increased in the Czech and Slovak Republics and Poland. This was reflected not only in the 
cancellation of mass privatisation schemes, but also in the growing resistance of domestic 
classes to potential foreign competitors in the mid-1990s. Domestic owners (including the 
public sector), however, had variable levels of management skills and limited capital sources 
and, in the longer term, have not been able to prevent the growth of foreign investment. 
 
  The results of the liberalisation of capital movements have been ambiguous. The 
transition economies liberalised their trade and capital accounts far more rapidly than the 
newly industrialised economies in Asia. The Asian countries opted for a more gradual 
approach, with the trade account being opened first, followed by later liberalisation of the 
capital account. In contrast, the transition economies applied the ‘big-bang’ approach to the 
regulation of capital flows. On the one hand, this helped them to secure a significant part of 
the foreign capital available in the emerging markets in the 1990s. On the other hand, the 
rapid liberalisation of international capital movements came before the implementation of 
important market reforms, for example in the money, exchange rate, securities and real 
estate markets. The lack of such reforms made the respective markets vulnerable to sudden 
outflows of foreign finance. The countries, which maintained a pegged regime of exchange 
controls (Czech and Slovak Republics) experienced high real appreciation of their national   35 
currencies and were forced to abandon these regimes after attacks by foreign speculators. 
The cascade devaluation regimes, applied by Hungary and Poland, proved more stable and 
also helped to maintain lower deficits in trade balances. 
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Table 1: The financial account of the Balance of Payments for selected emerging markets, 
1985-1997  
 
  $ million  Per capita, $ 
  1985-89 1990-94 1995-97 1985-89 1990-94 1995-97 
  Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and Poland 
Total -17,534  420  43,588  -274.8  5.9  675.8 
  FDI net  255  14,452  26,697  4.0  224.5  413.9 
  Portfolio net  0  8,139  7,203  0.0  126.3  111.7 
  Other investment net  -17,789  -22,171  9,688  -278.8  -344.9  150.2 
  Argentina, Brazil and Mexico 
Total -59,191  142,147  124,068  -235.2  516.0  428.8 
  FDI net  19,469  46,022  81,071  77.7  168.0  280.7 
  Portfolio net  -8,771  164,694  76,269  -35.3  594.4  263.0 
  Other investment net  -69,889  -68,569  -33,272  -277.6  -246.4  -114.9 
  Korea, Malaysia and Thailand 
Total -3,997  111,880  76,328  -35.8  932.0  610.9 
  FDI net  7,275  26,014  14,579  64.0  217.4  114.9 
  Portfolio net  4,101  30,263  52,096  38.0  249.8  411.4 
  Other investment net  -15,373  55,603  9,653  -137.8  464.8  84.6 
 
Sources: IMF (1985-1999): Balance of Payments Statistics and authors’ own computations.  
Notes: all values in current US dollars.   40 
Table 2: Financial account of the Balance of Payments for the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
Hungary and Poland, 1985-1997  
 
  $ million  Per capita $ 
  1985-89 1990-94 1995-97 1985-89 1990-94 1995-97 
  Czech Republic
) 
Total  273  10 711  13 663  17.5  1 035.9  1 326.5 
  FDI net  257  3 155  5 183  16.4  305.1  503.2 
  Portfolio net  0  2 411  3 084  0  233.2  299.4 
  Other investment net  16  5 145  5 396  1.0  497.6  523.9 
  Hungary 
Total  4 270  10 542  4 658  410.6  1017.6  458.9 
  FDI net  0  6 375  8 108  0  615.3  798.8 
  Portfolio net  0  6 383  303  0  616.1  29.9 
  Other investment net  4 270  -2 216  -3 753  410.6  -213.9  -369.8 
  Poland 
Total  -22 077  -20 683  20 193  -581.6  -536.7  523.3 
  FDI net  -2  4 595  12 925  -0.1  119.2  334.9 
  Portfolio net  0  -624  3 576  0  -16.2  92.7 
  Other investment net  -22 075  -24 654  3 692  -581.5  -639.7  95.7 
  Slovak Republic 
Total 0  -150  5  074  0  -28.3  943.1 
  FDI net  0  327  481  0  61.7  89.4 
  Portfolio net  0  -31  240  0  -5.8  44.6 
  Other investment net  0  -446  4 353  0  -84.2  809.1 
 
Sources: IMF (1985-1999): Balance of Payments Statistics and authors’ own computations.  
Notes: all values in current US dollars. The data for the Czech Republic in 1985-9 refers to the former 
Czechoslovakia . 
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Figure  1: Cross-section OLS estimates for net capital inflows to the central European 
transition countries  
 
  model 1  model 2  model 3 
FD I
 a      
Intercept  2.514 (1.347; 0.191)     
GROWTH -0.144
 (-1.897, 0.070)     
M2 0.001117
 (2.436; 0.023)     
INF -0.0081
 (-1.905; 0.069)     
GDP -0.00431
 (-2.478; 0.021)     
R
2 and Adjusted {R
2} 0.372  {0.262}     
F-test: p-value  0.025     
Portfolio investment      
Intercept  -1.681 (-1.076; 0.291)     
GDP  0.0008882 (1.833; 0.077)     
R
2 and Adjusted {R
2} 0.101  {0.071}     
F-test: p-value  0.077     
Other investment      
Intercept  3.822 (1.757; 0.089)  3.818
 (3.340; 0.002)  -4.743 (-2.292; 0.0293) 
INF  -0.0212 (-2.672; 001)  -0.208
 (-3.459; 0.002)   
MARGIN   -0.190
 (-3.008; 0.005)  0.0205 (2.531; 0.017) 
M2  0.00783 (2.3518; 0,017)    0.0877 (2.879; 0.007) 
R
2 and Adjusted {R
2}  0.422 {0.382}  0.463 {0.426}  0.410 {0.369} 
F-test: p-value  0.0004  0.0001  0.0005 
 
Note: T-statistics and p-values (significance levels) reported in parenthesis.  
a = time lag one year 